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VIRTUE, MASCULINITY, AND HIERARCHIES OF DOMINATION IN 
PLUTARCH’S ANTONY AND DE ISIDE 
L Warren (Stellenbosch University) 
Plutarch’s Antony and De Iside et Osiride together tackle the manly 
woman and the effeminate man. I suggest that De Iside is the 
theoretical exposition of the metaphysics underlying this problem of 
gender, resolved by gendering the parts of the tripartite soul. In the 
Antony, these expressions of gender in the body are examined in 
practice. Female masculinity is defined as a manifestation of virtue 
without contradicting the natural fact of the female body, while 
manliness is an unvirtuous expression of a desire to dominate. 
Plutarch refines the hierarchy of domination that affirms women’s 
claim to virtue and preserves traditional social order by examining 
the relation between embodied sex and ensouled gender and 
assigning an ethical value to its expressions.  
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Plutarch’s Life of Antony has proven itself of enduring interest and remarkable 
depth, and has elicited special interest from scholars concerned with gendered 
discourse in imperial Rome and provincial Greece. Brigette Ford Russell (1998) 
has drawn together various aspects of the text that serve to emasculate Antony, 
while others have focused on the relationship between Antony and his wives as a 
model for the detrimental impact of uncontrolled erōs (Beneker 2012:153ff) or 
female domination in politics (Blomqvist 1997:76). For Jill Harries (1998:184), 
Plutarch was a significant voice in the gender debate in antiquity, while McNamara 
(1999:151) suggests that he represents a rupture in the philosophical discourse of 
gender. That Plutarch considered Antony’s marriage to Cleopatra disgraceful is not 
in doubt, indeed he says just that in the comparatio to the Lives of Demetrius and 
Antony (1.3). Nor is Russell (1998:122-125) mistaken when she points out that 
Antony’s masculinity degenerates throughout the course of the biography, and that 
it is often tied to his relationship with Cleopatra or his assimilation into foreign 
cultures. 
In the Antony, gender continually appears as a site of contention and 
(mis)identification. Like De Iside et Osiride, it was likely created during the latter 
part of Plutarch’s career, though the order is not certain.1 For Fred Brenk (1992) 
Cleopatra and Antony represent an anti-Isis and anti-Osiris. Brenk made excellent 
                                                   
1  Brenk 1992:162. With gratitude to the National Research Foundation of South Africa for 
funding this project, and to the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments. 
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points, above all that elements from De Iside appear again in the Antony but are 
distorted (1992:164). I aim to continue this line of inquiry by arguing that Plutarch 
engenders the tripartite soul as a means to examine how bodies come to express 
non-binary gendered characteristics, i.e. how the female participates in masculinity 
and the male in femininity, and thus to assign an ethical value to such expressions. 
The Antony serves as the practical examination of this theory of the gendered soul. 
Like De Iside, the majority of the Antony is structured as a triadic struggle 
for power, with Cleopatra on one end as a foreign threat, Octavia(n) on the other as 
the champion(s) of Rome, and Antony caught in the middle. Platonic allusions to 
the soul elevate this push-and-pull of power to the level of moral-psychological 
failing and metaphysical struggle.2 References to mythological figures that unsettle 
the gender binary strengthen this meta-narrative of psychic domination and 
submission. In doing so Plutarch highlights the changeability of human nature. 
He’s often concerned with the soul of his subjects.3 Morality is a fundamental 
aspect of the Lives, where ideas of right and wrong — virtue and vice — are 
explored in practical terms (Duff 1999:65). The Antony deals with the complex 
relationship between men and women, masculinity and femininity, and continually 
echoes themes found in the Moralia that highlight the conflict of gender. 
Georgia Tsouvala claims that Plutarch ‘believed that a woman with a 
‘masculine’ mind and soul could be an ideal partner’ (2014:192); what Plutarch 
means when he endorses masculine qualities in women is almost exclusively 
confined to a philosophical understanding of female masculinity as logos. 
McInerney (2003:321) notes the problems that arise when virtue is construed as a 
transfiguration into masculinity, and the implicit approval of manly women that 
shift entails. Consequently, he argues (2003:324-325) that Plutarch’s manly 
women in Mulierum virtutes are ‘manly’ in the sense that they exhibit masculine 
virtue in a traditional way, but it requires a great deal of obfuscation to avoid 
thereby also approving of expressions of manliness in female bodies. In the same 
vein, Halberstam (1998:28) questions why femininity is so readily accessible and 
masculinity so resilient to imitation. Ancient models suggest that this is because 
                                                   
2  For this metaphor in Plato see Resp. 439d. Duff 1999:72-80 has shown that Platonic 
psychology is fundamental to understanding the Lives, as has Beneker 2012 and Swain 
1999:86. The more recent consensus — exemplified in Nikolaidis’ 2008 collection  
The unity of Plutarch’s work — that the Lives and the Moralia are mutually reinforcing 
has opened new avenues for the exploration of gendered discourse in Plutarch’s work. 
See also van Nuffelen 2012:50 on the unity of philosophy and religion in Plutarch. 
3  Duff 1999:60-62 points out that the Antony does not contain a simple moral lesson, but 
rather hinges on an exploration of Platonic ‘great natures’ present in the Moralia as well. 
Duff 1999:72-82 also provides an excellent analysis of the Platonic conception of the 
soul in Plutarch’s work, its functioning in the Lives and the role of education within this 
moral framework. 
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effeminacy is already a defective masculinity, that personhood aspires to maleness 
by way of rational masculinity or devolves into femaleness by way of irrational 
femininity, and that virtue and vice are contingent on this distinction. Plutarch’s 
‘masculine’ women therefore don’t challenge the established social hierarchy, they 
only redefine it within the framework of male domination. 
Engendering the soul 
Plutarch was in many ways a traditionalist. Conjugalia praecepta takes a 
prescriptive approach to conjugality in which the husband is the leader of the 
household (139a, 139d). Much of the text rests on the premise that submission is 
woman’s natural state of being and that harmony in the household is achieved 
through male domination. Here, as elsewhere, Plutarch connects the proper 
functioning of the home and the roles of husband and wife in it with gendered first 
principles. Wohl (1997:171) argues that while Conjugalia praecepta is focused on 
the couple, it does not do away with the (barely) implicit hierarchy which identifies 
the female with corporeality and the male with reason. Plutarch himself could not 
have made it more explicit (Conj. praec. 142e): 
So is it with women also; if they subordinate themselves to their husbands, 
they are commended, but if they want to have control, they cut a sorrier 
figure than the subjects of their control. And control ought to be exercised 
by the man over the woman (κρατεῖν δὲ δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα τῆς γυναικὸς), not as 
the owner has control of a piece of property, but, as the soul controls the 
body (ὡς ψυχὴν σώματος) …4 
In De Iside a similar gendering of principles occurs.5 The text lays emphasis on Isis 
acting in support of Osiris, identifying the former with materiality (365c) and the 
latter with reason (352a, 373f). Isis is the feminine principle of nature (τὸ τῆς 
φύσεως θῆλυ, De Is. et Os. 372e), as Osiris is the masculine (372a). The corporeal 
principle appears also in De animae procreatione in Timaeo, where matter is 
                                                   
4  All translations are from the LCL. Cf. Quaest. Plat. 1001b-c on the two constituent parts 
of the universe, body and soul, and the former’s submission to the latter. 
5  For Ann Chapman 2011:7 De Iside is not ‘concerned with either gender or the 
relationship between male and female’, but its female addressee, Clea, is particularly 
important for Plutarch’s purpose, i.e. the establishment of a principle of domination and 
subordination. The establishment of such a principle necessarily concerns male-female 
relationships and must therefore be incorporate with the text, as the focus on the 
relationship between Isis and Osiris throughout shows. Wohl 1997:171 also suggested 
that Conjugalia praecepta is fundamentally based on domination and male hegemony, 
and Lin Foxhall 1999:139 argued that discourses of domination are ubiquitous in 
Plutarch’s work, especially those aimed at regulating women’s behaviour in marriage.  
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described as ‘mother’ and ‘nurse’ (1015e, De Is. et Os. 364d, 373f; cf. Pl. Ti. 51a). 
In this metaphysical schema the mother becomes the paradigm for the female 
(Irigaray 1985:16), mothering is the quintessential function of the feminine.6  
For Irigaray this separation of matter and form amounts to an obfuscation of the 
female in favour of the pre-existent authority of the male (1985:307). She is 
reduced to her reproductive function, barely-existent without it and yet necessary 
for the figuration of the masculine, which contains the reproductive power.7 
When Plutarch identifies the deities with heavenly bodies his language 
invokes reproduction and sexual duality: Osiris is the moon with whom Isis 
associates, but the moon is the mother of the world and by nature both male and 
female (De Is. et Os. 368d). Therefore, it’s better to identify Osiris with the sun 
(372a-d) upon whom the moon depends (372f; cf. Quaest. Plat. 1006f).8  
The feminine continually strives toward masculinity, is defined by her proximity 
and submission to it, and is helpless without it (374d). As the maternal figure, Isis 
cares for the child Osiris fathers with her sister Nephthys (De Is. et Os. 368e). She 
takes on the role of a loving wife, the materiality unto which the dominant 
principle imparts the Forms. His is the Mind in which concepts are assembled, in 
which rational thinking finds its origin, and hers is the body moved by him (De Is. 
et Os. 374f-375a).9 But she is not inert or inactive (De Is. et Os. 370f, 375c-d, 
                                                   
6  Cf. Brisson 2002:41, who notes the connection between active and passive sexual roles 
and their gendered expressions, which assigns to women the role of wife and mother, 
while men are warriors. 
7  So too Plutarch at De Iside 375a. Butler 1993:18 argued that Irigaray mimes the Platonic 
discourse which excludes the feminine to show that it necessarily includes the feminine 
in its attempt at exclusion. In Female Masculinity, Jack Halberstam 1998:13 examined 
the notion that masculinity is a product of maleness and suggested that contemporary 
models of masculinity ‘depend on the prior production of masculinity by and through 
women as well as men’ (1998:46). 
8  Only allegorically: ‘it is not right to believe that water or the sun or the earth or the sky 
is Osiris or Isis; or again that fire or drought or the sea is Typhon, but simply if we 
attribute to Typhon whatever there is in these that is immoderate and disordered by 
reason of excesses or defects; and if we revere and honour what is orderly and good and 
beneficial as the work of Isis and as the image and reflection and reason of Osiris, we 
shall not be wrong’ (De Is. et Os. 376f). 
9  This conception of the male-female relationship is hardly ancient, see e.g. Perl’s 
dedication in Thinking being, Introduction to metaphysics in the Classical tradition 
(2014): ‘To Christine, In spousal togetherness, being to my thinking’ — the persistence 
of the body-mind distinction between the sexes has serious implications for our 
understanding of gender in the 21st century. 
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376b), she is moved by her erōs, her search for his reason, her desire for existence. 
Because the alternative is no existence at all.10  
Elizabeth Spelman argued that philosophers’ conceptions of the soul/body 
distinction has consequences throughout much of their work (1982:110). This is 
especially true in Plutarch, where women are more visible than most other ancient 
philosophers. It’s nearly impossible to remove from Plutarch his interest in 
conjugality and read only what’s left: he considered the (heterosexual) married 
couple the most sacred and beneficial union (Amat. 750c). The myth of Isis and 
Osiris is therefore reconstructed within the framework of Platonic first principles to 
represent a loving and virtuous conjugal union (Stadter 1999:176; cf. De Is. et Os. 
374f-375a). The relationship between Isis and Osiris is similar to that between Soul 
and Intellect at De animae procreatione 1024c-d, where Plutarch describes the 
effect of the logos upon entering the soul as turning it towards the Good. Osiris, he 
tells us, is only accessible as a dim vision or through contemplation (De Is. et Os. 
382c-f). Isis, in her role as distributor of the Forms, is enamoured with the beauty 
of the Good and always pursues it (383a; cf. Pl. Resp. 440e). 
Plutarch then turns to a cosmic structure in which he refers to Osiris as the 
creative element, Typhon as the destructive element, and Isis as the nurturing 
element that harmonises the two opposing forces (374d-375a; cf. Pl. Resp. 442a). 
He connects these principles with the Pythagorean numbers, where one is Apollo, 
two is Strife, and three is Justice, which, ‘by reason of its equality intervenes 
between the two’ (Is. Os. 381f; cf. Arist. Metaph. 986a21-6). Isis is Justice because 
of her wisdom and her role as guardian of and guide to the Realm of Truth (De Is. 
et Os. 352b). This view of a divine triad stems from his reading of Plato (De Is. et 
Os. 370f-371a): 
but in his Laws, when he had grown considerably older, he asserts, not in 
circumlocution or symbolically, but in specific words, that the movement of 
the Universe is actuated not by one soul, but perhaps by several, and 
certainly by not less than two, and of these the one is beneficent, and the 
other is opposed to it and the artificer of things opposed. Between these he 
leaves a certain third nature, not inanimate nor irrational nor without the 
power to move of itself, as some think, but with dependence on both those 
others, and desiring the better always and yearning after it and pursuing it… 
Here Plutarch argues that Plato posits at least two principles and an additional 
‘third nature’ (τρίτη φύσις). This allows him to identify the triad Osiris-Isis-
                                                   
10  De Iside 375c-d is particularly enlightening: ‘The creative and conserving element of 
Nature moves toward him and toward existence while the annihilating and destructive 
moves away from him towards non-existence’ (375c). 
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Typhon with three principles that together form the soul, in which Osiris is 
Intelligence and Reason (371b), Typhon is κακία (371d), ‘that part of the soul 
which is impressionable, impulsive, irrational and truculent, and of the bodily part 
the destructible, diseased and disorderly’ (371b), and Isis is filled with emotion, 
she gets sad and angry (357d-e; cf. Pl. Resp. 436b, 440a-b) in Osiris’ absence. 
The reference at Antony 36.1 to the ‘stubborn and unmanageable beast of 
the soul, of which Plato speaks’ (cf. Pl. Phdr. 246a, 254a) suggests that at least 
here Plutarch is considering the soul in its tripartite form (cf. Pl. Resp. 435c). This 
soul — the soul present in humans — is a copy of the World Soul, constituted of 
the principles present in De Iside and from which Plutarch constructs his moral 
psychology (Opsomer 2005:180, 2012:311). Following Plato, the soul therefore 
consists of a rational, spirited and appetitive part (Resp. 439d-440e), personified by 
Osiris (reason), Isis (passion) and Typhon (appetite) in their allegorical roles as 
cosmic forces in De Iside. Osiris and Typhon are principles of logos and chaos that 
are fundamentally opposed (De Is. et Os. 367e, 371b; cf. Petrucci 2016:234-235). 
Isis, caught in the middle (367a), acts as Mediator (369f).11 
Typhon, as a principle of chaos, is described in terms that evoke 
irrationality, passion and changeability in the soul (De Is. et Os. 369a-e; 371b), and 
disease and disorder in the body (371b; cf. An. proc. 1014e-1015b). Thus the name 
Seth denotes the overpowering and Bebon the restraint of reason (371b-c).12  
This chaotic force is present especially in the body (371a). Isis remains susceptible 
to the power of Typhon (375a) and is ever more so once embodied (An. proc. 
1025d); he draws her away from reason.13 Accounting for Typhon’s gender is 
particularly difficult; how could the lowest part of the soul be male and maintain 
the supremacy of the male and the masculine? Indeed, according to Dillon, Isis and 
Typhon are aspects of the same corporeal female principle, though he notes that 
Plutarch assigns the origin of evil to Typhon, a male entity (1985:118-119). More 
recently, he assigned Typhon to the role of matter and Receptacle (2014:64), a 
distinctly feminine aspect of the cosmos. Dillon also considers the irrational soul 
not only passively material but actively disruptive (2002:231), though this 
                                                   
11  Cf. Quaest. Plat. 1007e-1008e which argues that the θυμοειδές occupies the space 
(χώρα) midway between the λογιστικόν and the ἐπιθυμητικόν. 
12  Two other names by which Typhon is known, cf. De Is. et Os. 376b. 
13  Isis yearns for the good and tries to avoid and reject the portion which comes from evil 
‘for she serves them both as a place and means of growth’ (372e-f). In Quaest. Plat. 
1008b Plutarch makes the further point that the mediating principle, i.e. passion, must be 
intermediate between reason and appetite because it is natural for it to be ruled by and 
obedient to reason and to chastise appetite when it disobeys reason. This is the role filled 
by Isis in De Iside when Horus defeats Typhon but she refuses to destroy him, desiring 
rather cosmic (or: psychic) harmony (358d, 373c-d). 
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disruptive force represented by Typhon in De Iside is not identical with matter 
(2002:233). He conflates Isis and Typhon in an attempt to reconcile this triad 
within the framework of Platonic dualism but makes no further attempt to explore 
the implications of this gendering of the irrational soul. Yet in assigning Isis and 
Typhon to a single feminine entity, Dillon perhaps unknowingly exposed the 
problem of gender present in both De Iside and the Antony. 
De virtute morali describes the spirited and appetitive parts of the soul as 
aspects of the same irrational principle (Opsomer 2007:387, 2012:321; Virt. 
mor. 441f-442a, Adul. amic. 61b, Quaest. Plat. 1008e; cf. Pl. Ti. 35a). 
Gendering this lower part of the soul as both male and female through the 
personifications of Typhon and Isis therefore affords Plutarch an opportunity 
to explore the nature of non-binary gender and to assign an ethical value to 
such expressions of gender. In the just soul logos reigns supreme, supported by 
the spirited part (Pl. Resp. 442a-b). In De Iside, Isis as the spirited part moves 
towards the Good, represented by Osiris (370f, 375a, 383a). Together they force 
the appetites into submission, thereby creating a harmonious soul. Being virtuous 
requires that the soul deny the lowest part of itself (Pl. Grg. 505a-b). Virtue then 
amounts to a masculinisation of the soul through the subordination of passion to 
reason without contradicting the facticity of the body.14 This movement of the 
feminine towards reason at the level of human soul represents the actions of a 
virtuous person; the union of Isis and Osiris in their roles as passion and reason 
therefore produces a masculine soul with a positive ethical value. The relation of 
this masculine soul to the body is one of normative gender, exemplified in its 
ability to produce legitimate offspring (Horus; cf. De Is. et Os. 366a-c) capable of 
defeating Typhon.15 
There’s a close relation between these principles of feminine corporeality 
and masculine rationality and conceptions of the male as active and dominant and 
the female as passive and submissive. Being passive is feminine or effeminate, 
assuming the role of the woman as receiver (Krenkel 2006:472; Brisson 2002:41, 
61).16 Aristotle links passion and passivity in men to deformity in the genitals (such 
                                                   
14  On the natural submission of passion to reason, see Pl. Resp. 441e. 
15  Plutarch affirms the legitimacy of Horus’ birth in terms that recall the participation of 
Matter in the Forms, thereby also reaffirming to the reader that the work is dealing with 
metaphysical principles by way of religious study: ‘Therefore it is said that [Horus] is 
brought to trial by Typhon on the charge of illegitimacy, as not being pure nor un-
contaminated like his father, reason unalloyed and unaffected of itself (λόγος αὐτὸς καθ᾿ 
ἑαυτὸν ἀμιγὴς καὶ ἀπαθής), but contaminated in his substance because of the corporeal 
element (ἀλλὰ νενοθευμένος τῇ ὕλῃ διὰ τὸ σωματικόν)’ (De Is. et Os. 373b; cf. 358d). 
16  See Dover 1989:103-105 on the assimilation of the passive partner to the role of a 
woman or a foreigner, which in effect denies his citizenship. A similar dichotomy 
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as that found in eunuchs), which is only a small step away from becoming female 
([Arist.] Pr. 4.26, cf. Gen. an. 775a). The penetrated body is feminised by its 
passivity (Amat. 751e): 
But to consort with males (whether without consent, in which case it 
involves violence and brigandage; or if with consent, there is still weakness 
and effeminacy (μαλακίᾳ καὶ θηλύτητι) on the part of those who, contrary 
to nature, allow themselves in Plato’s words ‘to be covered and mounted 
like cattle’) … 
But a system that is reliant on a sort of biological determinism to regulate sexual 
roles is ill-equipped to deal with the active feminine and the passive masculine, i.e. 
the manly woman and the effeminate man, and even more so in cases where that 
distinction is increasingly blurred. Thus for Butler (1993:22-24), the inversion and 
reversion of activity and passivity pose serious risks to Plato’s metaphysical 
hierarchy of gender. 
It’s within this context that Plutarch wrote a treatise endorsing masculine 
(τὸ ἀνδρεῖον, Amat. 769b) qualities in women. Ismenodora threatens to destabilise 
the division between male-masculine and female-feminine made on the basis of 
sex and enforced through a system of social exclusion.17 Her actions are improper 
because it upsets the balance of power, where power is understood as a position of 
action in opposition to passion,18 which is effeminate and weak. Beyond the act of 
seizing control that upsets Plutarch’s interlocutors,19 Ismenodora is motivated by 
desire, by her passion for Bacchon, by the thing that decent women cannot have, 
erōs. But Ismenodora is a decent woman by all accounts, old enough to be wise yet 
still young enough to produce children (Amat. 749d). For Plutarch, there’s no 
logical reason such a woman should be excluded from participating in virtue, and 
thus by definition in some form of masculinity (Amat. 769b). After all, men and 
women have the same souls,20 though women possess the weaker, the second-hand 
                                                                                                                     
between being male and being feminine and foreign arises in the Antony and is 
discussed below. 
17  See Becker 2016:922-924 on the restrictions on Roman women’s daily lives. 
18  Effeminate men were considered both passive and passionate, qualities that were more 
properly assigned to women (Edwards 1993:81). 
19  Pisias condemns Ismenodora on the grounds that she has rejected many viable suitors 
and settled on young Bacchon out of a desire to command and to dominate (ἄρχειν καὶ 
κρατεῖν, Amat. 752f). 
20  Plutarch shares Plato’s view on the immortality of the soul; in the Cons. ux. he tells 
Timoxena that the soul is ‘imperishable’, and ‘affected like a captive bird, if it has long 
been reared in the body and has become tamed to this life by many activities and long 
familiarity’ it becomes ‘entangled in the passions and fortunes of this world through 
repeated births’ (611e; cf. Amat. 764e). See Grg. 493a and Cra. 400b-c, both of 
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souls, embodied as not-quite-men.21 In this matrix, female masculinity becomes a 
signifier of virtue, but it also poses the danger of legitimising manly women and so 
necessitates delimitation of the parameters of virtuous masculinity and unvirtuous 
manliness, virtuous femininity and unvirtuous effeminacy. 
Plutarch addresses this destabilisation of gender by locating the site of its 
conflict in the soul. Doing so preserves the body and its reproductive functions and 
assigns its expressions to a psychology of gender. McInerney’s (2003:339-343) 
analysis of the Mulierum virtutes shows that women’s virtue, their masculinity, can 
only be commended when it functions in service of eliminating a threat to social 
order, thus maintaining and reproducing it. Similarly, Halberstam (1998:20, 27) 
argues that the fluidity of gender is precisely what allows its reification in a binary 
system. For Plutarch, then, gender functions within a heterosexual matrix 
reproduced in De Iside which attempts to stabilise the signification of ‘masculine’ 
and ‘feminine’ in relation to ‘male’ and ‘female’. In the cosmic hierarchy, the 
virtuous woman now comes to occupy a position of privilege in relation to the 
unvirtuous man — the man who is not man enough because he cannot control the 
feminine part of his soul. Naturally, the virtuous man will always enjoy primacy, 
but that is not what is really at stake in the Antony, one of only two explicitly 
negative biographies in the Lives. 
Destabilising gender 
Thus we return to the structure of the Antony and its relation to De Iside.  
After Fulvia’s sudden death (Ant. 30.2), the majority of the biography orbits a ‘love 
triangle’ that bears striking similarities to De Iside. For Brenk (1992:164), Octavia-
Antony-Cleopatra corresponds to Nephthys-Osiris-Isis, but Plutarch’s silence on 
Antony’s identification as Osiris is significant here. Brenk’s meticulous 
documentation of the allusions in the text make a compelling case for considering 
Antony an (anti-)Osiris figure of sorts, based on the identification of Osiris with 
Dionysos (De Is. et Os. 356b, 364d-e) and Plutarch’s identification of Antony with 
the latter (Ant. 24.3-4). Antony also identified himself with Heracles, a virile hero 
constituted on the spectrum between masculinity and femininity and actualised by 
those very contradictions (Loraux 1990:22). The identification with Dionysos 
creates a similar dichotomy between masculine and feminine, Greek and Oriental, 
                                                                                                                     
which refer to the Orphic doctrine of σῶμα σῆμα, and Phd. 70a-72d, which argues that 
souls are immortal but bodies perishable. Unvirtuous men are reincarnated into the 
bodies of women or brutes (Leg. 944e, Ti. 42b-c, 76e, 91a; cf. De Is. et Os. 363b). 
21  One barely needs to be reminded of Aristotle’s view that ‘we should look upon the 
female state as being as it were a deformity, though one which occurs in the ordinary 
course of nature’ (Gen. an. 775a15-16). 
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which risks his identity as male and as Roman citizen (cf. Burkert 2011:249-251; 
Krenkel 2006:465-466). When Plutarch first makes the connection between 
Antony and Dionysos he emphasises the god’s dual nature (Ant. 24.3-4):22 
At any rate, when Antony made his entry into Ephesus, women arrayed like 
Bacchanals, and men and boys like Satyrs and Pans, led the way before him, 
and the city was full of ivy and thyrsus-wands and harps and pipes and 
flutes, the people hailing him as Dionysos Giver of Joy and Beneficent. For 
he was such, undoubtedly, to some; but to the greater part he was Dionysos 
Carnivorous and Savage. 
The assimilation of Dionysos to Osiris in De Iside however denies this duality, 
laying claim instead to the simplicity of the god (cf. De Is. et Os. 382c; De E. 
393bc). This assimilation entails a change of nature (De Is. et Os. 362b) quite 
opposite to Antony’s descent into effeminate enslavement; Plutarch connects 
Osiris-Dionysos in his role as logos with virility (τὸ ἀνδρεῖον, De Is. et Os. 365f, 
cf. 365b-c) and beneficence (368b). Antony’s fall depends on this gendered 
dichotomy. Likewise, his association with Heracles at first seems to confirm his 
masculinity (Ant. 4.1-2): 
He had also a noble dignity of form; and a shapely beard, a broad forehead, 
and an aquiline nose were thought to show the virile qualities peculiar to the 
portraits and statues of Heracles. Moreover, there was an ancient tradition 
that the Antonii were Heracleidae, being descendants of Anton, a son of 
Heracles. And this tradition Antony thought that he confirmed, both by the 
shape of his body, as has been said, and by his attire. 
As the narrative continues the Heraclean link proves to be prophetic: Antony’s 
attempt to legitimise his children with Cleopatra via his Heraclean lineage is at best 
mildly successful (37.3), and before the Battle of Actium the Heracleium in Patrae 
is destroyed by lightning while Antony is staying there, as is the image of 
Dionysos in the Battle of the Giants at Athens, both bad omens (61.2-3). Finally, 
we are invited to consider how Omphalé and Cleopatra alike emasculate the hero 
(Comp. Demetr. et Ant. 3.3-4; cf. Prop. 3.11.17-20): 
Antony … like Heracles in paintings where Omphalé is seen taking away 
his club and stripping off his lion’s skin, was often disarmed by Cleopatra, 
subdued by her spells, and persuaded to drop from his hands great 
undertakings and necessary campaigns. 
                                                   
22  Brenk 1992:164 focuses on the positive aspect of Dionysos here, but it is clear that 
Plutarch intended the rather more negative ‘Dionysos Carnivorous and Savage’ to stick 
in the minds of his readers. 
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The episode with Omphalé also involves a transgressive act of crossdressing, 
though it’s not the only example of Heracles wearing women’s clothing (Loraux 
1990:34-36; cf. Plut. Quaest. Gr. 304c-d), and both the cults of Heracles and 
Dionysos celebrated festivals during which men dressed in women’s clothing 
(Krenkel 2006:465-466).23 Antony’s masculinity is therefore questioned at the 
outset through his association with Heracles, his compulsive conjugality confirmed 
when he projects Heracles’ succession onto his own, his submission to female 
domination solidified in the comparison between Cleopatra and Omphalé. 
Heracles’ connection with ‘Oriental’ motifs like the lion (Burkert 2011:320) here 
further serves the purpose of alienating Antony. Presenting his children in 
Macedonian and Median clothing (Ant. 54.5-6) suggests a cumulative descent into 
effeminate barbarism which recalls Heracles’ crossdressing, episodes that further 
these contradictions between the virile hero and emasculate enslavement to foreign 
habit.24 
Brenk notes that ‘when one recalls that Plutarch’s Osiris is Logos itself, the 
irony of an assimilation to Dionysus-Osiris becomes more ridiculous’ (1992:165). 
Antony thus cannot be an Osiris-figure since Osiris is perfect (De Is. et Os. 373b), 
and he is not the Dionysos identified with that deity, so who or what is he? To this 
Plutarch presents another allusive answer: Antony was the New Dionysos to 
Cleopatra’s New Isis (Ant. 60.3). If ancient custom and religion holds some 
semblance of the truth (De Is. et Os. 352e-f, 378a), the epithet ‘new’ might refer 
precisely to those whose misinterpretations of the nature of the gods are woefully 
inaccurate. Plutarch dismisses those who regard Dionysos as the god of wine for 
their misunderstanding of divinity (De Is. et Os. 377b-e, cf. 365a, 360c-d). 
Likewise, Philo reproaches Caligula for his cruelty and greed, calling him the ‘new 
Dionysos’ (Leg. 12.88-89), and Athenaeus seems to have connected expressions of 
νέος Διόνυσος to instances of excessive luxury (148d, 212c-f). Though there is 
ample evidence for Cleopatra’s assimilation to Isis, Plutarch is the only source that 
attributes to her this specific title, νέα Ἶσις (Ant. 54.6; Brenk 1992:162). Cleopatra 
as the ‘new Isis’ can also not be assimilated to the wise goddess in De Iside,  
not least because her actions are not in accord with those of Isis (cf. De Is. et Os. 
361d). 
Brenk’s suggestion that Antony and Cleopatra represent an anti-Osiris and 
anti-Isis fails to address a number of further contradictions raised by Plutarch’s 
references to the soul. Beneker suggests framing the progression of Antony’s  
                                                   
23  Krenkel 2006:473-474 points out the connection between feminine clothing, sexual 
preference and control, and conceptions of masculinity and effeminacy. 
24  Cicero reproaches Antony for assuming the dress of a Gaul instead of that of a Roman 
(Phil. 2.76) as part of his strategy to emasculate his opponent. 
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Life within the constraints of his conjugal status, each period representing the 
progressive ‘psychological struggle between reason and erōs in his soul’ 
(2012:171-173; cf. Duff 1999:75). Such a framework highlights the gendered 
nature of virtue. Antony’s failure to practice self-control emasculates him and 
feminises his soul, while Cleopatra is masculinised. Beneker (2012:178n60) differs 
on the latter point on the basis that Plutarch is not concerned with Cleopatra’s 
manliness but with Antony’s weakness. On the contrary, there is ample indication 
that Plutarch considered the two mutually reinforcing. 
The embodied soul 
Consider now the primary conflict of the Antony, occupying roughly two-thirds  
of the biography, between Octavia, Antony and Cleopatra. Brenk’s suggestion that 
this ‘love triangle’ is significant (1992:164) remains cogent, but I disagree with his 
identification of Octavia with Nephthys. It appears that his main justification for 
this connection is the completion of the love triangle, but Osiris’ legitimate partner 
is Isis (De Is. et. Os. 356a, 366c), as Antony’s legitimate partner is Octavia  
(Comp. Demetr. et Ant. 4.1), while Osiris only accidentally sleeps with Nephthys 
(De Is. et Os. 356f, 375b). It seems unlikely that Plutarch would opt to gloss this 
particular point in view of his regard for the sanctity of marriage. Brenk’s error in 
this regard is his rigidity when it comes to gender, leading him to seek out two 
women and a man in De Iside that correspond to the trio in the Antony.  
The references to Cleopatra as Isis lends this theory credence but does little to 
explain the metaphysical structure of the soul suggested in De Iside. Each of these 
three characters can be identified with one of the deities of De Iside only if the 
purpose of such an identification is to provide an allegorical key to the parts of the 
soul that rule them. If anything, it appears that Plutarch has committed another 
inversion that seeks to explore the psychic hierarchy and its gendered implications 
in practical terms.25 
Since the Antony is intended as a negative example, let us start with the 
principles that contribute to change, Isis and Typhon. Though Osiris is not once 
named in the Antony, Typhon is briefly mentioned near the start of the narrative, 
notably at Antony’s first foray into Egypt (3.2-4). Antony doesn’t take the role of a 
Typhonic figure, in fact, he plays the role of mediator between Ptolemy and the 
citizens of Pelusium, preventing the Egyptian from massacring his own people 
(3.5-6). Instead, Egypt itself is set up as a site of chaos and its pharaohs appear as 
agents of destruction. The ‘blasts of Typhon’ (Ant. 3.3) is a warning of decay, 
                                                   
25  As Duff rightly noted, the Moralia are works of moral theory, the Lives ‘works in which 
the theory is examined — and questioned — in practice’ (1999:5). 
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Egypt signifies his sphere of influence and the resulting events that would lead to 
Antony’s fall. 
Consequently, the Egyptian queen appears as a chaotic force in the Antony. 
His passion for Cleopatra is the final evil Antony must face (Ant. 25.1) and from 
which he cannot escape; he was taken captive (28.1).26 Ultimately, Cleopatra would 
become ‘the woman who had already ruined him and would make his ruin still 
more complete’ (Ant. 66.5). Her actions echo Typhon’s: she’s jealous of Octavia 
and sees her as a competitor to be conquered (Ant. 53.3-5, 57.1), and she deceives 
Octavian into thinking that she wished to live (83.4-5), as Typhon also tricked 
Osiris into his coffin (De Is. et Os. 356c-d). One might well imagine the following 
extract as describing Cleopatra (De Is. et Os. 361d): 
Stories akin to these and to others like them they say are related about 
Typhon; how that, prompted by jealousy and hostility, he wrought terrible 
deeds and, by bringing utter confusion upon all things, filled the whole 
Earth, and the ocean as well, with ills, and later paid the penalty therefor. 
Cleopatra is the signifier for destructive appetite which ‘destroyed and dissipated 
whatever good and saving qualities [in Antony] still offered resistance’ (Ant. 25.1). 
Her appearance at their first meeting is decadent and seductive and the feast she 
organises is beyond anything Antony could describe or replicate (26.4-27.1).  
Her excessive luxury is a recurring theme of the biography, exemplified in their 
societies of Inimitable Livers (28.2) and Partners in Death (71.3). When he’s not 
with her Antony is able to refrain from such luxuries and live on bare necessities, 
as he had done before (17.2-3) and will do again during the Parthian campaign 
(45.5). Antony might have a natural taste for luxury (2.3), but it’s Cleopatra who 
brings out the worst in him. 
More compelling still is the reconstruction of Osiris’ penis by Isis (358b), 
suggesting that the virtuous feminine will go to great lengths to preserve the 
masculine claim to authority of her partner. This Cleopatra does not do.  
Her position of power almost necessarily emasculates the men around her, so that 
resisting her, as Octavian does after the defeat at Actium, becomes a mark of 
strength of character (Flor. 2.10; Prop. 3.11). The men who serve her are 
enervated, they’re eunuchs (Ant. 60.1, Luc. B. Civ. 10.133) and perverted men 
(turpium morbo virorum; Hor. Carm. 37.5-12). Octavian’s decision to declare war 
on Cleopatra questions Antony’s masculinity (Russell 1998:125); he has given his 
authority to a woman (Ant. 60.1) and as a result has less power than the effeminate 
men and enslaved women who serve her. 
                                                   
26  See Pelling 1988:193, who notes the connotations to war and violence the language here 
evokes. 
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Cleopatra is ruled by the Typhonic element of her soul, and thus possessed 
of an emasculate soul in a female body that is assigned a negative ethical value; 
Cleopatra is not virtuous. Clearly the dominant partner, she’s masculinised through 
a series of domineering acts and the brute fact of her considerable political and 
military power (Wyke 2002:219,227). Plutarch documents her manliness early on; 
she adopts the manner of a soldier toward Antony, ‘unrestrained and boldly’  
(Ant. 27.2), joins him in his activities, hunting with him, drinking with him, 
stopping just short of swordplay, though she keeps a watchful eye (Ant. 29.1).  
At Actium she insists on leading her own forces in direct defiance of Antony’s 
orders (57.2-3). Even as early as the campaign in Parthia she had established 
control over Antony (Ant. 37.4). Like Osiris, Typhon loses his manhood (in the 
battle against Horus, De Is. et Os. 373d; cf. Griffiths 1970:33, 506-507), but unlike 
Osiris, there is nobody to reconstruct it for him. Plutarch suggests that he was 
infertile from the get-go,27 not-quite-man, too defective to be male. So also 
Cleopatra plays at being male and fails. 
If Cleopatra represents a Typhonic figure, Antony represents Isis.  
He occupies a contested space between reason and appetite in which his own  
actions would make a decisive difference. He is dominated by Cleopatra (οὐδὲ 
αὑτοῦ κρατοίη, 60.1), when he flees Actium he is not only emasculated (66.4),  
he is defined by the passion in his soul (τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἐρῶντος, 66.5) and finally 
he has no power beyond Egypt (71.1-2), and that by virtue of Cleopatra.  
Geminius and Canidius tell him that all would be well if he sent Cleopatra  
away (Ant. 59.4, 63.4), implying the necessity of controlling his appetites (and  
his woman). Spending time with Octavia might have corrected his course  
were it not for his passion for Cleopatra (36.1, cf. 72.2-3).28 With her, Antony 
degenerates into passivity; she feminises him (τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐξέτηξαν καὶ 
ἀπεθήλυναν, Ant. 53.6). Antony has become Isis; the feminine principle rules  
his soul. Cleopatra’s chaotic presence destroys Antony’s reason, the masculine 
rationality of his embodied soul, as Typhon too destroys Osiris’ body (De Is. et Os. 
373a-b).29 His cowardice at Actium (66.3-5) is the proverbial nail in the coffin.  
                                                   
27  According to Plutarch, Nephthys was unable to produce children after her marriage to 
Typhon (De Is. et Os. 366c), which initially might suggest that she is the one who 
cannot reproduce, yet when Osiris sleeps with her she produces a child, suggesting 
instead that the problem might lie with Typhon. Thus his identification with drought and 
saline water. 
28  Appian drives this point home by describing the difference in Antony’s character after 
spending a significant amount of time with Octavia: he was like a new man (B. Civ. 
5.8.76). 
29  Dillon 2002:233 notes that Typhon destroys Osiris’ body but not his soul, since the 
former represents the individual logoi derived from God, but the latter is indestructible 
as the eternal and unchanging logos of God. 
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Cowardly men were considered androgyne (Brisson 2002:61) and Plutarch refers 
to Antony as ‘dragged along’ (Ant. 66.4) by Cleopatra, with whom he had become 
incorporate (Ant. 66.4; cf. 62.1). The reference here to the soul of the lover and 
unity in marriage recalls advice from Conjugalia praecepta, which suggests that a 
couple in love form an intimate union in which they share all things in common 
(142f-143a).30 Before he dies he declares himself inferior to her (76.3). These final 
scenes confirm that passion rules in Antony and that he followed it to its direst 
conclusion. 
For Butler (1993:17), the descent into passion and appetite transfigures  
the soul into the signs of its descent, first woman, then beast. In Antony, the soul 
has become effeminate, yet embodied still as male and is thus assigned a negative 
ethical value. One might reasonably infer that Antony’s soul would be reincarnated 
as a woman, Cleopatra’s as a beast (cf. De Is. et Os. 380c). It’s this structure  
that informs Plutarch’s understanding of Antony’s failings, represented as 
uncontrollable erōs, as Beneker (2012:153-194) and Duff (1999:78-80) had shown. 
In De Iside and in the Antony this chaotic force is an expression of non-normative 
gender. Perhaps it is the suggestion of a partnership between Isis and Typhon, 
passion and appetite,31 that constitutes the fundamental problem of gender in the 
Antony: a soul that veers away from the path of reason is embodied as an 
effeminate man or a manly woman, enslaved to its desires. Fulvia, by all accounts 
quite manly, so much so that Velleius proclaimed that ‘she had nothing of the 
woman in her except her sex’ (2.2), is diminished in Plutarch’s account of 
Antony’s life. Domineering women who wish to control men are written into 
obscurity; Cleopatra is an exception. Her story is so entwined with the fall of the 
Roman Republic and Octavian’s rise to power that she cannot be erased. There is 
thus only one resolution for her, to become the archetype of the unvirtuous woman, 
in whom disfigured gender leads to destruction and ruin. 
It follows then that the truly virtuous woman cannot be masculine except in 
the very narrow philosophical sense, since maintaining social order requires that 
she remain the embodiment of female and femininity long established. Primary 
among these qualities is the maternal female. The virtuous woman is defined by 
her devotion to her children and her husband (De Is. et Os. 356f, 368e, 357a-c, 
372e), thus Octavia cares for all of Antony’s children including those he had with 
Fulvia and Cleopatra, marrying them into noble families (Ant. 54.2, 87.1). She’s 
obedient even while her husband’s actions are detrimental to her (Ant. 53.1-3, 
                                                   
30  Of course, this doesn’t negate the advice that the husband ought always to lead. 
31  On the mediating principle’s ability to side with either reason or appetite see also  
Pl. Resp. 440b. In this sense Plutarch makes Isis as the feminine principle the decisive 
force in the struggle for virtue and vice in the soul. 
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57.3). In the paradigm of De Iside the virtuous woman is elevated to a status 
almost equal to that of the virtuous man: Isis and Osiris were deified because of 
their virtue (De Is. et Os. 361e, 362e) while Typhon remained a demigod (362e-f). 
Typhon considered Osiris a threat to his desire for power, as Cleopatra considers 
Octavia a threat because of her virtue (Ant. 53.3; cf. 57.1-2). 
Octavia as Antony’s legitimate partner therefore represents Osiris. She’s 
described in much the same terms as Osiris and Ismenodora, with concepts that 
denote reason and virtue (νοῦς, 31.2; καλός, 54.2; cf. Amat. 754d). Likewise,  
‘in the soul Intelligence (νοῦς) and Reason (λόγος) … is Osiris’ (De Is. et Os. 
371b). Octavia is ruled by the rational part of her soul, she’s masculine but not 
manly, and thus her actions are assigned a positive ethical value; she is virtuous.  
In the absence of Antony’s guidance Octavia doesn’t seize control but rather  
defers to the next male authority figure: Octavian.32 So also Octavia is more 
beautiful than Cleopatra (Ant. 27.2, 31.2, 57.3), because true beauty is not confined 
to the body but is a matter of the soul (Amat. 766a-c; cf. Quaest. Plat. 1002e,  
Pl. Symp. 221a). True beauty leads the lover to contemplation of things divine, 
while beautiful things — beautiful bodies — are images that distract the lover from 
noble pursuits. 
Beneker (2012:185) argues that in the struggle for Antony’s soul Cleopatra 
as foreign wife represents passion and Octavia as Roman wife represents reason. 
He also rightly notes the similarities between Octavia and Ismenodora, in particular 
in the terminology used (2012:186). But Cleopatra isn’t the representative of 
passion so much as the chaotic force that draws Antony’s soul away from reason. 
Antony himself is the passionate lover, the passive male to Cleopatra’s active 
female. Octavia fills the vacuum where Antony ought to have been. Here is the 
example of a woman with a ‘masculine’ mind, embodied still as a wife and a 
mother. Nothing about her threatens the established social order, in fact, she 
confirms its validity. Octavia is only an Osiris insofar as her soul is governed by 
reason. As a woman submission and reproduction remains her raison d’être, and 
Plutarch is not about to throw that out of the window. 
Equal, but sometimes superior 
Plutarch has, not surprisingly, elicited wildly differing evaluations of his views on 
women. It’s undeniable that he had great respect for (some) women and considered 
them capable of virtue (Nikolaidis 1997) and yet at times viewed them with 
contempt (Walcot 1999). Scholars have continually returned to the conclusion that 
                                                   
32  Octavia’s deferral to Octavian in the absence of Antony’s leadership is fundamental  
to her characterisation (Ant. 53.1), and her loyalty is a central aspect of the final chapter 
(87). 
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Plutarch considered women ‘equal, but inferior’.33 As ridiculous as that statement 
appears to the contemporary feminist, it would no doubt have made sense to 
Plutarch, who might see in it similarities to Plato’s statement that ‘many women 
… are better than many men in many things’ (Resp. 455d). In his metaphysical 
schema virtuous men and women, having almost-equal souls, work together to 
uphold the established social order. This is best done through the constraints of 
conjugality. In this framework he creates space for the masculine woman to 
surpass the effeminate man, who in turn supersedes the manly woman, all of whom 
are subject to the masculine man. In doing so, he assigns an ethical value to 
normative and non-normative expressions of gender. 
De Iside and the Antony frame the hierarchy of domination as a distinction 
not just between sexed bodies but also between engendered souls. Plutarch refines 
in theory and in practice the relation of the body to the soul and its gendered 
expressions, transferring the signs of biological sex to the soul. If male and female 
are the bodily signs of the condition of the soul at the moment of its most recent 
incarnation, masculinity becomes an expression of virtue in the embodied soul, 
manliness and effeminacy the embodied signs of its decay. The virtuous soul 
aspires to masculinity only in ways that don’t threaten social order or contradict  
the necessary fact of the body. In this binary, virtue isn’t assigned on the basis  
of sex but on the relation of sex to gender at the nexus of domination and 
submission, all of which must be controlled and regulated through the practice of 
philosophy. 
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